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Abstract
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves
outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition
that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) su¢ cient for robust implementation.
Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and
almost su¢ cient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary
and almost su¢ cient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on
all type spaces. It requires that there not be too much interdependence of types.
We characterize robust monotonicity for some interesting economic environments. We iden-
tify conditions where, if robust implementation is possible, it is possible in a direct mechanism.
We identify conditions where, if robust implementation is not possible, virtual robust imple-
mentation is not possible either.
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1 Introduction
The mechanism design literature provides a powerful characterization of which social choice func-
tions can be achieved when the designer has incomplete information about agentstypes. If we
assume a commonly known common prior over the possible types of agents, the revelation principle
establishes that if the social choice function can arise as an equilibrium in some mechanism, then
it will arise in a truth-telling equilibrium of the direct mechanism (where each agent truthfully
reports his type and the designer chooses an outcome assuming they are telling the truth). Thus
the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints characterize whether a social choice function is
implementable in this sense.
There are two important limitations of Bayesian incentive compatibility analysis. First, the
analysis typically assumes a commonly known common prior over the agentstypes. This assump-
tion may be too stringent in practise. In the spirit of the "Wilson doctrine" (Wilson (1987)), we
would like implementation results that are robust to di¤erent assumptions about what players do
or do not know about other agentstypes. Second, the revelation principle only establishes that the
direct mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves the social choice function. In general, there
may be other equilibria that deliver undesirable outcomes. We would like to achieve full imple-
mentation, i.e., show the existence of a mechanism all of whose equilibria deliver the social choice
function. We studied the rst "robustness" problem in an earlier work, Bergemann and Morris
(2004). The second "full implementation" problem has been the subject of a large literature. In
the incomplete information context, key full implementation references are Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). In this paper, we study "robust
implementation" where we require robustness and full implementation simultaneously. Requiring
both simultaneously adds extra structure to the problem and enables us to derive distinctive new
economic results.
Interim implementation on all type spaces is possible if and only if it is possible to implement
the social choice function using an iterative deletion procedure. We refer to the resulting notion as
iterative implementation. We x a mechanism and iteratively delete messages for each payo¤ type
that are strictly dominated by another message for each payo¤ type prole and message prole that
has survived the procedure. This observation about iterative deletion illustrates a general point
well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory (e.g., Brandenburger and
Dekel (1987), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)): equilibrium solution concepts only have bite if we
make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e., we assume small type spaces where the common
prior assumption holds.
We exploit this equivalence between robust and iterative implementation to obtain necessary and
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su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation in general environments. Our necessity argument is
conceptually novel, exploiting the iterative characterization. The necessary conditions for robust
implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the social choice function and a condition
- robust monotonicity - that is equivalent to requiring interim monotonicity on every type space.
Suppose that we x a "deception" specifying, for each payo¤ type i of each agent, a set of types
that he might misreport himself to be. We require that for some agent i and a type misreport of
agent i under the deception, for every misreport 0 i that the other agents might make under the
deception, there exists an outcome y which is strictly preferred by agent i to the outcome he would
receive under the social choice function for every possible payo¤ type prole that might misreport
0 i; where this outcome y satises the extra restriction that no payo¤ type of agent i prefers
outcome y to the social choice function if the other agents were really types 0 i. This condition -
while a little convoluted - is easier to interpret than the interim (Bayesian) monotonicity conditions.
It is very strong and implies both Maskin monotonicity and ex post monotonicity conditions (but
is strictly weaker than dominant strategies). We will present examples to illustrate the relationship
between these monotonicity conditions.
The su¢ ciency argument requires only a modest strengthening of the necessary condition by
guaranteeing the existence of a badoutcome. With the existence of a bad outcome, we show that
the necessary conditions are also su¢ cient for robust implementation. The su¢ cient conditions
guarantee robust implementation in pure, but more generally also in mixed strategies. Our robust
analysis thus removes the frequent gap between pure and mixed strategy implementation in the
literature.
The iterative characterization comes with the additional benet that tight implementation re-
sults can be proved via a xed point of a contraction mapping. In particular, we consider a general
class of interdependent preferences in which the private types of the agents can be linearly aggre-
gated. In this environment we show that the social choice function can be robustly implemented if
and only if the interdependence is not too large. If  is the weight of the type of agent j (relative to
the type of agent i) for the utility of agent i, then the robust implementation condition can simply
be stated as:  < 1= (I   1), where I is the number of agents. Surprisingly, the converse result for
 > 1= (I   1) even extends to a robust version of virtual utility. In other words, we also show that if
 > 1= (I   1), then not only robust implementation, but even robust virtual implementation fails.
We further illustrate the strength of the contraction mapping idea in the implementation context
with two examples, one of a public good and one of a private good (single unit auction) allocation
problem with quasilinear utility. An important paper of Chung and Ely (2001) analyzed the single
(and multi-unit) auction with interdependent valuations with dominance solvability (elimination of
weakly rather than strictly dominated actions). In a linear and symmetric setting, they reported
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su¢ cient conditions for direct implementation that coincide with the ones derived here. We show
that in the environment with linear aggregation, under strict incentive compatibility, the basic in-
sight extends from the single unit auction model to general allocations models, with elimination of
strictly dominated actions only (thus Chung and Ely (2001) require deletion of weakly dominated
strategies only because incentive constraints are weak). We also prove a converse result: if there
is too much interdependence, then neither the direct nor any augmented mechanism can robustly
implement the social choice function (this result will also hold with deletion of weakly dominated
strategies).
In the implementation literature, it is a standard practice to obtain the su¢ ciency results
with augmented mechanisms. By augmenting the direct mechanism with additional messages, the
designer may elicit additional information about undesirable equilibrium play by the agents. Yet, in
many environments common to applied mechanism designs, such a single crossing or supermodular
preferences, the structure of the preferences may already permit direct implementation (see a
companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2005), for direct implementation results in ex post
equilibrium). We thus provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation in the
direct mechanism. In the direct mechanism, the agents can alert the designer only by a report of
their type. In consequence, the incentive compatibility conditions for the rewards are identical to
the truth-telling constraints, and the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation
coincide.
The results in this paper concern full implementation. An earlier paper of ours, Bergemann and
Morris (2004), addresses the analogous questions of robustness to rich type spaces, but looking at the
question of partial implementation, i.e., does there exist a mechanism such that some equilibrium
implements the social choice function. We showed that ex post (partial) implementation of the
social choice function is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for partial implementation on all type
spaces.1 This paper establishes that an analogous result does not hold for full implementation.
In a companion paper, Bergemann and Morris (2005), we therefore investigate the notion of ex
post implementation. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions then straddle the Nash and Bayesian
implementation conditions as an ex post equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium at every incomplete
information (Bayesian) type prole. However in contrast to the iterative argument pursued here,
the basic reasoning in Bergemann and Morris (2005) invokes more traditional equilibrium argu-
ments. By comparing the conditions for ex post and robust implementation, it becomes apparent
that robust implementation typically imposes additional constraints on the allocation problem. In
Bergemann and Morris (2005), we showed that in single crossing environments, the same single
1This result does not extend to social choice correspondences.
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crossing conditions which guarantee incentive compatibility also guarantee full implementation. In
contrast, in the linear aggregation environment, we show that robust implementation imposes a
strict bound on the interdependence of the preferences, which is not required by the truthtelling
conditions. The contraction mapping behind the iterative argument directly pointed at the source
of the restriction of the interaction term.
In this paper, we follow the classic implementation literature in allowing for arbitrary mech-
anisms, including modulo and integer games. By allowing for these mechanisms, we are able to
make tight connections with the existing implementation literature. Allowing for these badly be-
haved mechanisms does complicate our analysis: for example, we must allow for transnite iterated
deletion of best responses in our denition of iterative implementation. Of course, when direct im-
plementation turns out to be possible, we do not need badly behaved mechanisms. We also report
some results on what happens with "nice" mechanisms where rationalizable messages always exist








Jackson (1991) m m Theorem 2
Bayesian Monotonicity





Figure 1: Relationship between Bayesian and Robust Implementation / Monotonicity
Our results extend the classic literature on Bayesian implementation due to Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) and Jackson (1991). We focus in this paper on
an indirect approach to extending these results. We rst note the equivalence between robust
implementation and iterative implementation. We then exploit the equivalence to report a direct
argument showing that robust monotonicity is a necessary and almost su¢ cient condition for itera-
tive implementation. But in the light of the classic literature, we know that a necessary and almost
su¢ cient condition for robust implementation must be Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.
We conrm and clarify our results by directly checking that robust monotonicity is equivalent to
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Bayesian (or interim) monotonicity on all type spaces. Figure 1 gives a stylized account of the
connection between these alternative approaches.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal environment
and solution concepts. Section 3 considers four examples that illustrate the main results of the
paper. Section 4 establishes the relation between iterative and robust implementation. Section
5 establishes necessary conditions for robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Section
6 reports our main result on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation.
Section 7 explores the link between robust and virtual implementation. Section 8 considers the
preference environment with a linear aggregation of the types and obtains sharp implementation
results. Section 9 discusses extensions and variations of our implementation results, examining
the role of lotteries, pure strategies and "nice" mechanisms. Section 10 concludes. The Appendix
contains some additional examples and proofs.
2 Setup
2.1 The Payo¤ Environment
We consider a nite set of agents, 1; 2; :::; I. Agent is payo¤ type is i 2 i. We write  2  =
1     I . There is a set of outcomes Z. We assume that each i and Z are countable. Each
individual has von Neumann Morgenstern utility function ui : Z   ! R. Thus we are in the
world of interdependent types, where an agents utility depends on other agentspayo¤ types. We
allow for lotteries over deterministic outcomes.2 Let Y = (Z) and extend ui to the domain Y 
in the usual way:
ui (y; ) =
X
z2Z
y (z)ui (z; ) .
A social choice function is a mapping f :  ! Y . If the true payo¤ type prole is , the planner
would like the outcome to be f (). In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the implementation
of a social choice function rather than a social choice correspondence or set.3
2.2 Type Spaces
We are interested in analyzing behavior in a variety of type spaces, many of them with a richer
set of types than payo¤ types. For this purpose, we shall refer to agent is type as ti 2 Ti, where
2The role of the lottery assumption and what happens when we drop it are discussed in Section 9.1.
3The extension to social choice correspondences might not be straightforward. One reason is that with social
choice correspondences, the incentive compatibility conditions that arise from requiring partial implementation would
typically be weaker than ex post incentive compatibility, as shown by examples in Bergemann and Morris (2004).
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Ti is a countable set.4 A type of agent i must include a description of his payo¤ type. Thus there
is a function bi : Ti ! i with bi (ti) being agent is payo¤ type when his type is ti. A type of
agent i must also include a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus there
is a function bi : Ti ! (T i) with bi (ti) being agent is belief type when his type is ti. Thusbi (t i) [ti] is the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to other agents having types t i. A type







A planner must choose a game form or mechanism for the agents to play in order the determine the
social outcome. Let Mi be the countably innite set of messages available to agent i.5 Let g (m)
be the distribution over outcomes if action prole m is chosen. Thus a mechanism is a collection
M = (M1; :::;MI ; g ()) ;
where g :M ! Y .
2.4 Solution Concepts
Now holding xed the payo¤ environment, we can combine a type space T with a mechanismM to
get an incomplete information game (T ;M). The payo¤ of agent i if message prole m is chosen
and type prole t is realized is then given by
ui

g (m) ;b (t) .
A pure strategy for agent i in the incomplete information game (T ;M) is given by
si : Ti !Mi.
A (behavioral) strategy is given by
i : Ti ! (Mi) .
The objective of this paper is to obtain implementation results for interim, or Bayesian Nash,
4The countable types restriction claries the relation to the existing literature. In Section 9.3, we discuss what
happens if we allow for uncountable type spaces.
5This assumption claries the relation with the existing literature. We discuss in Section 9.2 what happens if we
restrict attention to nite messages.
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equilibria on all possible types spaces.6 The notion of interim equilibrium for a given type space T
is dened in the usual way.
Denition 1 (Interim equilibrium)
A strategy prole  = (1; :::; I) is an interim equilibrium of the game (T ;M) if, for all i, ti and

















1Aui g  m0i;m i ;b (t) bi (t i) [ti]
for all m0i.
The concern for robustness, expressed by the qualifying condition, for all type spaces, pulls
the interim equilibrium in the direction of rationalizability. Consequently we dene a message
correspondence prole S = (S1; ::::; SI), where each Si : i ! 2Mi and we write S for the collection
of message correspondence proles. The collection S is a lattice with the natural ordering: S  S0




, where Si (i) = Mi for
each i and i. The smallest element is S = (S1; :::; SI), where Si (i) = ? for each i and i.
We dene an operator b to iteratively eliminate never best responses. To this end, we de-
note the belief of agent i over message and payo¤ type proles of the remaining agents by i 2
(M i  i). The operator b : S ! S is now dened as:









i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i))
P
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ; 8m0i 2Mi
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
:
We observe that b is increasing by denition: i.e., S  S0 ) b (S)  b (S0). By Tarskis xed





6We label these "interim" equilibria rather than "Bayesian" equilibria in light of the fact that our type space does
not have a common prior. Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2002) argue that learning justications that support the
equilibrium assumption will - under reasonable assumptions - also imply a common prior on types. We nonetheless
maintain the equilibrium solution concept for comparison with the literature. But note that in any case we end up
using the fact that with rich type spaces, equilibrium does not have any bite above iterated deletion.
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(ii) b (S) = S ) S  SM. We can also construct the xed point SM by starting with S - the
largest element of the lattice - and iteratively applying the operator b. If the message sets are nite,
we have









But because the mechanismM may be innite, transnite induction may be necessary to reach the
xed point.7 Thus SMi (i) are the set of messages surviving (transnite) iterated deletion of never
best responses. If message sets are nite (or compact), a well known duality argument implies that
never best responses are equivalent to strictly dominated actions. However, the equivalence does
not hold with innite (non-compact) message sets.8 In a compact message analysis, Chung and Ely
(2001) consider a version of this solution concept in an incomplete information mechanism design
context with dominated (not strictly dominated) messages deleted at each round. We observe that
the solution concept dened through the iterative application of the operator b is weaker than the
notion of interim rationalizability for a given type space T .9 Under b, every agent i is allowed to
hold arbitrary beliefs about  i and is not restricted to a particular posterior distribution over
 i. On the other hand, if the type space T were the universal type space, then SMi (i) would be
equal to the union of all interim rationalizable actions of agent i over all types ti 2 Ti whose payo¤
type prole coincides with i, or bi (ti) = i.
For brevity and for lack of a better expression, we refer to the messages mi 2 SMi (i) as
rationalizable actions.
2.5 Implementation
We now dene the notions of interim, robust and iterative implementation.
Denition 2 (Interim Implementation)
Social choice function f is interim implemented on type space T by mechanism M if the game
7Lipman (1994) contains a formal description of the transnite induction required (for the case of complete
information, but nothing important changes with incomplete information). As he notes "we remove strategies which
are never a best reply, taking limits where needed".
8The following simple example (suggested to us by Andrew Postlewaite) illustrates the non-equivalence. Players
1 and 2 each choose a non-negative integer, k1 and k2 respectively. The payo¤ to player 1 from k1 = 0 is 1. The
payo¤ to player 1 from action k1  1 is 2 if k1 > k2, 0 otherwise. For any belief that player 1 has about 2s actions,
there is a (su¢ ciently high) action from player 1 that gives him a payo¤ greater than 1. Thus action 0 is never a best
response for player 1. However, for any mixed strategy of player 1, there is a (su¢ cient high) action of player 2 such
that action 0 is a better response for player 1 than the mixed strategy. Thus action 0 is not strictly dominated.
9For the notion of interim rationalizability, see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2005).
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(T ;M) has an equilibrium and every equilibrium  of the game (T ;M) satises
 (mjt) > 0) g (m) = f
b (t) .
We note that a tradition in the implementation literature commonly restricts attention to pure
strategy equilibria, but we allow mixed strategy equilibria.10
Denition 3 (Robust Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly implemented by mechanism M if, for every T , f is interim
implemented on type space T by mechanismM.
We observe that the notion of robust implementation requires that we can nd a mechanism
M which implements f for every type space T . A weaker requirement would be to ask that for
every type space T there exists a, possibly di¤erent, mechanism M such that f is implemented.
This weaker notion would still lead to the same necessary condition as the stronger implementation
version we pursue here, and we believe that it would not lead to a substantial change in the
su¢ ciency conditions either.
We shall establish the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation via the
iterative deletion process outlined above.
Denition 4 (Iterative Implementation)
Social choice function f is iteratively implemented by mechanismM if, for all , SM () 6= ? and
if for all  and m; m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f ().
3 Examples
We precede the formal results with four examples which are meant to illustrate the main insights
of the paper. At the same time, they will facilitate a brief review of the key results in the imple-
mentation literature.
The rst example is a model of majority rule introduced by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989).
It highlights the di¢ culty of Bayesian implementation in a world of interdependent values. Ex
post implementation and virtual implementation on some type spaces are possible, but interim
implementation is impossible for some type spaces and thus robust implementation is impossible.
The second example builds around a simple coordination game. It shows that robust imple-
mentation, even though it is strong requirement, is substantially weaker than dominant strategy
implementation. It also highlights the role of augmented mechanisms in achieving implementation.
10We discuss the pure strategy / mixed strategy modelling choice in Section 9.1.
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The third example involves the provision of a public good with quasilinear utility. It demon-
strates that robust implementation can frequently be achieved in the direct rather than the aug-
mented mechanism. In addition, the example illustrates the relationship between robust implemen-
tation and rationalizability. In fact, we obtain a tight condition, in terms of the interdependence
for robust implementation. Conversely, if the conditions fails, we show that even robust virtual
implementation is impossible.
The fourth and nal example investigates a single unit auction with symmetric bidders. The
generalized Vickrey-Groves-Clark mechanism only satises weak rather than strict incentive com-
patibility constraints. We therefore propose an "-e¢ cient allocation rule with strict ex post incentive
constraints. The " e¢ cient allocation rule can also be interpreted as virtual implementation of the
e¢ cient rule. In either case, we show that the rule itself can be either robustly implemented or
robust virtually implemented, respectively, if there is not too much interdependence among the
payo¤ types.
3.1 Majority Rule
In the rst example, introduced by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), there are three agents and each
has two possible "payo¤ types", a or b. There are two possible choices for society, a or b. All
agents have identical preferences. If a majority of agents (i.e., at least two) are of type y, then
every agent gets utility 1 from outcome y and utility 0 from the other outcome. The social choice
function agrees with the common preferences of the agents. Thus f : fa; bg3 ! fa; bg satises
f () = y if and only if # fi : i = yg  2. It is useful to use this simple example to review the
existing implementation literature and understand the role of interdependent types.
Clearly, incentive compatibility is not a problem in this example. The problem is that in the
"direct mechanism" - where all agents simply announce their types - there is the possibility that all
agents will choose to always announce a. Since no agent expects to be pivotal, he has no incentive
to truthfully announce his type when he is in fact b. What happens if we allow more complicated
mechanisms?
If there were complete information about agentspreferences, then the social choice function is
clearly implementable: the social planner could pick an agent, say agent 1, and simply follow that
agents recommendation.
But suppose instead that there is incomplete information about agentspreferences. In partic-
ular, suppose it is common knowledge that each agents type is b with independent probability q,
with q2 > 12 . This example fails the Bayesian monotonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmei-
dler (1986) and Jackson (1991). Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) observe that it is also not possible
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to implement in undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this example.
Bergemann and Morris (2005) have analyzed the alternative "more robust" solution concept
of ex post equilibrium in this context. It is easy to construct an augmented mechanism whose
only ex post equilibrium delivers the social choice function. Let each agent send a message
mi 2 fa; bg  ftruth, lieg, with the interpretation that an agent is announcing his own type and
also sends the message "truth" if he thinks that others are telling the truth and sends the message
"lie" if he thinks that someone is lying. Outcome y is implemented if a majority claim to be type
y and all agents announce "truth"; or if either 1 or 3 agents claim to be type y and at least one
agent reports lying.
There is a truthtelling ex post equilibrium where each agent truthfully announces his type and
also announces "truth". Now suppose there exists an ex post equilibrium such that at some type
prole, the desired outcome is not chosen. Note that whatever the announcements of the other
agents, each agent always has the ability to determine make the outcome y, by sending the message
"lie" and - given the announcements of the other agents - choosing his message so that an odd
number of players have claimed to be type y. So this is not consistent with ex post equilibrium.
Serrano and Vohra (2005) show that virtual Bayesian implementation is possible in this example.
The idea is that it is possible to exploit common knowledge of q to design a bet as a function of
q that will give each player an incentive to truthfully announce his type. This bet may lead to
a small but positive probability that the wrong outcome is realized in equilibrium. But virtual
implementation is possible.
Robust implementation is impossible in this example. Consider the type space where there is
common knowledge that whenever an agent is type y, he assigns probability 12 to both of the other
agents being type y0 6= y and probability 12 to one being type y and the other being y
0. Thus every
type of every player thinks there is a 50% chance that outcome a is better and a 50% chance that
b is better. Evidently, there is no way of designing a mechanism that ensures that agents do not
fully pool. But if they fully pool, robust implementation is not possible.
3.2 Coordination
This example establishes that although robust implementation is a strong requirement, it is weaker
than dominant strategies. There are two agents. Each agent i has two possible types, i and 0i.
There are six possible outcomes: Z = fa; b; c; d; z; z0g. The payo¤s of the agents are a function of
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1 3; 3 0; 0




1 0; 0 3; 3




1 0; 0 1; 1




1 1; 1 0; 0





1 2; 2 2; 0




1 2; 0 2; 2
01 2; 0 2; 2
:







Clearly, the social choice function is strictly ex post incentive compatible. But in the "direct
mechanism" where each agent simply reports his type, there will always be an equilibrium where
each type of each agent misreports his type, and each agent gets a payo¤ of 1. This is also strictly
ex post incentive compatible. The social choice function f which selects among fa; b; c; dg embeds
a coordination game. We further observe that the payo¤ for agent 1 from allocations z and z0 are
equal and constant for all type proles. On the other hand, the payo¤ of agent 2 from z and z0
depends on his type but not on the type of the other agent.







The corresponding incomplete information game has the following payo¤s:
type 2 02
type action 2 02 2 
0
2
1 1 3; 3 0; 0 0; 0 3; 3
01 0; 0 1; 1 1; 1 0; 0
 2; 2 2; 0 2; 0 2; 2
01 1 0; 0 1; 1 1; 1 0; 0
01 3; 3 0; 0 0; 0 3; 3
 2; 2 2; 0 2; 0 2; 2
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Suppose we iteratively remove actions for each type that could never be a best response given the
type action proles remaining. Thus in the rst round, we would observe that type 1 would never
send message 01 and type 
0
1 would never send message 1. Knowing this, we could conclude that
type 2 would never send message 02 and type 
0
2 would never send message 2. This in turn implies
that neither type of agent 1 will ever send message . Thus the only remaining message for each
type of each agent is truth-telling. But now they must behave this way in any equilibrium on any
type space.
3.3 Public Good
The third example describes the provision of a public good with quasilinear utility. The utility of
each agent is given by:





where x is the level of public good provided and yi is the monetary transfer to agent i. The
utility of agent i depends on his own type i 2 [0; 1] and the type prole of other agents, with
  0. The cost of establishing the public good is given by c (x) = 12x
2. The planner must choose
(x; y1; :::; yI) 2 R+RI to maximize social welfare, i.e., the sum of gross utilities minus the cost of
the public good:  








The socially optimal level of the public good is therefore equal to




We choose essentially unique (up to a constant) transfers that give rise to ex post incentive com-
patibility:









We rst argue that if  < 1I 1 , the social choice function f is robustly implementable in the direct
mechanism where each agent reports his payo¤ type i and the planner chooses outcomes according
to f on the assumption that agents are telling the truth. Consider an iterative deletion procedure.
Let S0 (i) = [0; 1] and, for each k = 1; 2; ::, let Sk (i) be the set of reports that agent i might
send, for some conjecture over his opponentstypes and reports, with the only restriction on his
conjecture being that each type j of agent j sends a message in Sk 1 (j).
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Suppose that agent i has payo¤ type i, has a point conjecture that other agents have type
prole  i and report their types to be 0 i, and he reports himself to be type 
0
i. Then his expected











1A 0i + 12  0i2
1A .








1A  0i = 0,
so he would wish to set







Note that this calculation veries the strict ex post incentive compatibility of f . The quadratic pay-
o¤ / linear best response nature of this problem means that we can characterize Sk (i) restricting
attention to such point conjectures. In particular, we will have
Sk (i) =
h
















8<:1; i +  max i X
j 6=i

j   k 1 (j)
9=; .
Analogously,
k (i) = max
















k (i) = max
n
0; i   ( (I   1))k
o
.
Thus 0i 6= i ) 0i =2 Sk (i) for su¢ ciently large k, provided that  < 1I 1 .
Robust Implementation June 8, 2005 16
On the other hand if  > 1I 1 , then we argue that there exist type spaces where the social choice
function f is not virtually implementable. Consider a type space where it is common knowledge











Observe that  > 1I 1 implies that we can choose the j to be in the interval [0; 1]. Agent is
preferences are independent of his type on this type space. Now x any mechanism and restrict
each player to a pooling strategy, i.e., sending the same message independent of his type. Since all
types now have identical preferences over outcomes, this pooling strategy is an equilibrium.11
3.4 Private Good
The nal example is a single unit auction with symmetric bidders. There are I agents and agent





where 0    1.
In Bergemann and Morris (2005), we showed that Maskin monotonicity fails in this example,
so complete information implementation is impossible. This in turn implies that robust implemen-
tation is impossible. But Bergemann and Morris (2005) also showed that ex post implementation
occurs in the direct mechanism if there are at least three agents.
We next argue that virtual robust implementation is possible in this example if  < 1I 1 . An








#fj:jk for all kg , if i  k for all k;
0; if otherwise.
A symmetric "-e¢ cient allocation rule is the following:
xi () = "
i
I
+ (1  ")xi () :
In the Appendix, we verify that the resulting generalized VCG transfers satisfy strict ex post
incentive compatibility and show that this "-e¢ cient allocation is robustly implementable. Under
11This argument is complete only if we know that an equilibrium exists in the game where players are restricted
to pooling strategies. This will be true for well-behaved mechanisms. Our general negative result holds even if this
is not guaranteed.
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this allocation rule, the object is not allocated with probability "2 . At the cost of some additional
algebra, we could replace this rule with




+ (1  ")xi ()
which allocates the object with probability 1.
However, if 1I 1 <   1, only constant allocations are robust implementable, by the same
argument as in the public good case: we can construct beliefs for each type such that types are
indistinguishable.
4 Interim Equilibrium and Iterative Elimination
The notion of robust implementation requires that a social choice function f can be interim im-
plemented for all type spaces T . As we look for necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust
implementation, conceptually there are (at least) two approaches to obtain the conditions.
One approach would be to simply look at the interim implementation conditions for every
possible type space T and then try to characterize the intersection or union of these conditions for
all type spaces. This is the approach we initially pursued, and it works in brute force kind of way.
In Section 9.1, we review what happens under this approach.
But we focus our analysis on a second, more elegant, approach. We rst establish an equiv-
alence between robust and iterative implementation and then derive the necessary conditions for
robust implementation as an implication of iterative implementation. The advantage of the second
approach is that after establishing the equivalence, we do not need to argue in terms of large type
spaces, but rather derive the results from a novel argument using the iterative elimination process.
A complicating element in the implementation context is the fact that the augmented mecha-
nisms often have innite message spaces and that best responses may not exist. These complications
are inherent to the entire implementation literature and we therefore have to carefully address these
issues before we establish the implementation results.
4.1 Best Response
We start with the xed point SM of the iterative elimination procedure. Recall that by denition,
SM is a xed point of b, and thus for all mi 2 SMi (i), there exists i 2 (M i  i) such that






ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i))
 ui (g (m0i;m i) ; (i;  i))
#
 0 for all m0i 2Mi
(1)
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Proposition 1 (Rationalizable Actions)
mi 2 SM (i) if and only if there exists a type space T , an interim equilibrium  of the game
(T ;M) and a type ti 2 Ti such that (i) i (mijti) > 0 and (ii) bi (ti) = i.
Proof. ()) Suppose mi 2 SM (i ). Now consider the following type space T dened through:
Ti =

(mi; i) : mi 2 SMi (i)
	
:
Let bi (mi; i) , i.
By (1), we know that for each mi 2 SMi (i), there exists 
mi;i
i 2 (M i  i) such that:
mi;ii (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 S
M













 0; 8m0i 2Mi.
Let bi (m i;  i) [mi; i] , mi;ii (m i;  i) .





i ) = m

i and b (mi ; i ) = i .
(() Suppose there exists a type space T , an equilibrium  of (T ;M), and mi 2Mi and ti 2 Ti
such that i (mi jti ) > 0 and bi (ti ) = i . Let
Si (i) =
n
mi : i (mijti) > 0 and bi (ti) = i for some ti 2 Tio .
Now interim equilibrium conditions ensure that b (S)  S. Thus S  SM. Thusmi 2 SMi
bi (ti ),
which concludes the proof.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) showed an equivalence for nite action complete information
games between the set of actions surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominant actions and the
set of actions that could be played in a subjective correlated equilibrium. Proposition 1 is a
straightforward generalization of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) to incomplete information and
innite actions. The innite action extension (for complete information) was shown in Lipman
(1994). The nite action incomplete information extension is reported in a recent paper of Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003) (following an earlier analysis in Battigalli (1999)).
Notice that there is no guarantee that SM (i) is non-empty or that the game (T ;M) has an
equilibrium: the Proposition holds vacuously in this case. But for implementation results, we care
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about existence. We have the following two conditions that relate existence of equilibrium on all
type spaces to the actions surviving iterated deletion.
Denition 5 (Ex Post Best Response)
Message correspondence S satises the ex post best response property if, for all i and i 2 i, there
exists mi 2 Si (i) such that
mi 2 argmax
mi2Mi
ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;
for all  i and m i 2 S ( i).
We observe that for S to satisfy the ex post best response property, Si must be non-empty for
all i and all i.
Denition 6 (Interim Best Response )
Message correspondence S satises the interim best response property if, for all i and  i 2 ( i),
there exists i 2 (M i  i) such that:
1. i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 Sj (j) for each j 6= i;
2. for all  i 2  i : X
m i2M i
i (m i;  i) =  i ( i) ;





i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) :
The interim best response property only requires that for every conjecture over payo¤ type
spaces, there exists some beliefs over messages consistent with the message correspondence S, such
that a best response is in the message correspondence. In particular, it does not require that a best
response exists for all possible beliefs over message proles. Note that the ex post best response
property is a stronger requirement than the interim best response property. Also note that the
interim best response property implies that SMi (i) is non-empty for all i and i.
Proposition 1 links every action prole in the set of rationalizable actions to an equilibrium
action for some type space T . Proposition 2 strengthens the relationship between rationalizable and
equilibrium actions, after imposing some structure on the best response property of rationalizable
and equilibrium actions, respectively.
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Proposition 2 (Best Response Properties)
1. If SM satises the ex post best response property, then (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each
T .
2. If (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T , then SM satises the interim best response property.
Proof. (1.) By the ex post best response property, there exists, for each i, si : i !Mi such
that












for all  i. Now x any type space. The strategy prole s with




is an equilibrium of the game (T ;M).
(2.) Suppose (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T . Fix any i and  i 2 ( i). Fix any




i ] =  i ( i) (2)
for all i and  i. The game has an equilibrium . Let mi be any message with i (mijti (i)) > 0.
Let
i (m i;  i) =
X
ft i2T i:b i(t i)= ig
 i (m ijt i)i (t i) [ti ] .
Now i (mijti (i)) > 0 implies




i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
Proposition 1 implies that every message prole mj which is played in equilibrium by type j is
part of the set SM, or that:
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 SMj (j) for each j 6= i.
By construction of the type space T , in particular property (c) as expressed by (2), this implies
that X
m i2M i
i (m i;  i) =  i ( i) for all  i 2  i.
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Since these properties hold for arbitrary i and  i 2 ( i), SM satises the interim best response
property, which concludes the proof.
It is unfortunate that there is a gap between the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in this
Proposition. However, an example in the Appendix shows that it is possible to construct (admit-
tedly silly) mechanisms where (T ;M) has an equilibrium for each T , but SM fails the ex post best
response property. The ex post best response property must be satised if the mechanism is nice,
i.e., best responses always exist.
4.2 Implementation
The rst part of the denition of implementation is the requirement that all outcomes that occur
in equilibrium are consistent with the social choice function. The rst denition checks if this is
true for some xed type space T and mechanismM.
Denition 7 (Interim Material Implementation)
Social choice function f is interim materially implemented on type space T by mechanism M if
every equilibrium  of the game (T ;M) satises
 (mjt) > 0) g (m) = f
b (t) ;
for all t.
The next denition checks if the same property holds for every type space:
Denition 8 (Robust Material Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly materially implemented by mechanism M if, for every T , f is
interim materially implemented on type space T by mechanismM.
Finally, we ask if iterated deletion delivers acceptable outcomes:
Denition 9 (Iterative Material Implementation)
Social choice function f is iteratively materially implemented by mechanism M if, for all , m 2
SM ()) g (m) = f ().
Now Proposition 1 immediately implies an equivalence between robust and iterative implemen-
tation.
Corollary 1 (Equivalence)
Social choice function f is iteratively materially implemented by M if and only if f is robustly
materially implemented by mechanismM.
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In all the above denitions, we qualied that implementation as being "material" because the
premise of the denition might be vacuous: the mechanism M might have the property that on
any type space, there is no equilibrium and no messages surviving iterated deletion.12
Proposition 2 gave the slightly messier result relating equilibrium existence and properties of
messages surviving iterated deletion. The following corollary gives the immediate implications for
our implementation denitions:
Corollary 2 (Necessary Conditions)
1. If social choice function f is iteratively materially implemented by mechanism M and SM
satises the ex post best response property, then f is robustly implemented byM.
2. If f is robustly implemented byM, then f is iteratively materially implemented by mechanism
M and SM satises the interim best response property.
The materialqualication will only be used in the necessity part of Theorem 2 where we shall
invoke the above Corollary 2.2. There we shall use the xed-point property of SM, stated earlier
in (1), to derive the robust monotonicity condition. In the su¢ ciency part of the proof, a non-
empty set SM is obtained in the augmented mechanism by virtue of ex post incentive compatibility.
Similarly, for the direct implementation results, a non-empty set SM exists by ex post incentive
compatibility and the material qualication is not needed at all. The following implication of
robust implementability will be used to establish robust monotonicity in Theorem 2.
Lemma 1 (Truthtelling as Best Response)
If f is iteratively materially implemented by mechanism M and SM satises the interim best





ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) (3)
for all mi 2Mi and i 2 i.
Proof. Applying the denition of the interim best response property for i and the degenerate









i (m i)ui ((mi;m i) ; (i;  i))  SMi (i) for all i 2 i.
12Our terminology mirrors the language of modal logic where proposition A materially implies B whenever A is
false, as well as when both A and B are true, see Hughes and Creswell (1996).
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But by iterative material implementability, m 2 SM ()) g (m) = f (). So
ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui ((mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;
for all mi 2Mi and i 2 i.
Lemma 1 shows how small the gap between the ex post and interim best response property is.
It establishes that truthtelling is a best response against some beliefs over messages m i for any
given payo¤ type prole  i.
5 Direct Implementation
We rst characterize when robust direct implementation is possible. By "direct mechanism", we
mean the mechanism where each agent simply reports his payo¤ type i, and so Mi = i for all i
and g () = f () for all . Thus we assume that agents do not report their "higher order belief"
types. "Truth-telling behavior" is the strategy of always truthfully reporting your payo¤ type.
Denition 10 (Robust Direct Implementation)
SCF f is robustly directly implementable if truth-telling is an equilibrium of the direct mechanism,
and f is interim implementable on any type space T by the direct mechanism.
A deception is a prole  = (1; ::; I), where:
i : i ! 2i

?;
with i 2 i (i) for all i, i.
Denition 11 (Acceptable / Unacceptable Deception)




= f (). A deception is unacceptable if it is not
acceptable.
The inverse mapping of the deception i represents the set of true type proles i which could









i 2 i (i)
	
:
A deception is a message correspondence prole in the special case of a direct mechanism.
Denition 12 (Ex Post Incentive Compatibility)
Social choice function f satises ex post incentive compatibility if









for all i, i, 0i and  i.
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Denition 13 (Direct Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises direct robust monotonicity if, for every unacceptable deception ,











































We will show direct robust monotonicity is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for implemen-
tation in the direct mechanism. In consequence, the designer can only o¤er those rewards to agent
i which can be generated through the social choice function f by a report of agent i, say 00i . The
focus on rewards which can be generated through type reports in the direct mechanism implies
that the incentive compatibility condition for claiming the reward y in the correct circumstances
(if and only if the other agents deceive) is automatically satised, provided that the social choice
function f satises ex post incentive compatibility.
Lemma 2 (Robust Implementation as Fixed Point)
f satises direct robust monotonicity if and only if   b ())  acceptable.
Proof. ()) The proof is by contradiction. Thus suppose that f satises direct robust
monotonicity and that the deception  is a xed point under the mapping b, but  is unacceptable.
In the direct mechanism, the set of messages isMi = i for all i. Then by hypothesis of direct robust









there exists 00i 2 i satisfying the strict inequality (4). But this implies that 0i =2 bi () [i] which
contradicts the xed point property of .
(() The proof is again by contradiction. Thus suppose that the xed point property   b ()
indeed implies that  is acceptable, but that f does not satisfy direct robust monotonicity. In other
words, let us suppose that there exists an unacceptable deception  for which we cannot nd i; i
and 0i 2 i (i) such that the inequality (4) can be satised. By hypothesis,  is unacceptable, and
it follows that the premise of the hypothesis, namely the xed point property cannot be satised
by . But this implies that there exists i and 0i with 
0
i =2 bi () [i]. But the exclusion means that




































but this delivers the desired contradiction.
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Theorem 1 (Robust Direct Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly directly implementable if and only if f satises EPIC and direct
robust monotonicity.
Proof. The existence of a truthtelling equilibrium on every type space is equivalent to EPIC (see
Bergemann and Morris (2004), Proposition 2). With the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium,
verifying robust implementation reduces to verifying iterative implementation by Proposition 1.
Iterative implementation requires that the largest xed point of b is acceptable. But Lemma 2
shows that this is guaranteed by direct robust monotonicity.
6 Robust Implementation
A "robust monotonicity" condition is key to our main result. In the direct mechanism, where





any 0i. But once we allow augmented mechanisms, we could conceivably o¤er agent i a larger set of
lotteries if he reports deviant behavior of his opponents. We need to identify, for any given report
 i, the set of lotteries with the property that whatever agent is actual type, he would never prefer




















for all 0i 2 i
	
.
Henceforth, we refer to the set Yi ( i) as the reward set (for agent i).
To understand the robust monotonicity condition, it is useful to rst think about agents playing
the direct mechanism. Suppose that it was common knowledge that in the direct mechanism, type
i of player i will send a report 0i 2 i (i). If  is acceptable, we would know that f was being
implemented. But if  is unacceptable, we must nd a type of some agent who is prepared to report
that other players are misreporting. But for the "whistle-blower" who is going to report that we
are in a bad equilibrium, we cannot know what he believes about the types of the other players,
nor can we know what message he expects to hear except that it is a message consistent with the
deception. Finally, the reward that he is o¤ered must not mess up the truth-telling behavior in the
good equilibrium. This gives the following condition:
Denition 14 (Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises robust monotonicity if for every unacceptable deception , there






, there exists y such that:X
 i2 i






































; for all 00i 2 i. (6)
Notice that this condition has a very similar form to the direct robust monotonicity condition.
We simply allow a richer set of rewards in an augmented mechanism. In addition, in the augmented
mechanism, agent i can propose an allocation conditional on the misreport 0 i of the other agents.
It therefore su¢ ces that the reward y agent i proposes in the event of report 0 i is successful for






which could have reported 0 i
under the deception  i. In contrast, if we were to seek robust direct implementation, the report
of agent i has to lead to rewards which work for all possible misreports 0 i and underlying true
type proles  i. In consequence, the expectation had to be taken both with respect to the reports







If we compare the notion of robust monotonicity with the notion of Bayesian monotonicity
for a given type space (see Denition 24), then three major di¤erences appear. First, the notion
of a deception is set-valued rather than point-valued. Second, the reward has to be successful
against all possible distributions  i ( i) over true payo¤ prole rather than a single distribution,
the posterior derived from the common prior. Third, the incentive constraints for the reward, (6),
have to be satised ex post rather than interim. All three modications directly stem from the
robustness concern. The deception has to be set valued as in a rich type, a given payo¤ type i can
now generate di¤erent misreports 0i through distinct types ti who all share the same true payo¤
type. Similarly, in a rich type space, there might be many distributions over payo¤ types,  i ( i),
which adopt a given misreport 0i. Finally, the ex post incentive constraints regarding the reward
y are necessary to maintain the truthtelling equilibrium in the direct revelation segment of the
augmented mechanism. This is the robustness property of the ex post constraints in the direct
mechanism developed in Bergemann and Morris (2004).
Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity and ex post monotonic-
ity (a necessary and almost su¢ cient condition for ex post implementation described in Bergemann
and Morris (2005)). To get a sense of the strength of the condition, we can return to the examples
of Section 3:
1. In the majority rule example, Maskin monotonicity and ex post monotonicity are both satis-
ed, but robust monotonicity fails.
2. In the coordination example, robust monotonicity (and thus Maskin and ex post monotonic-
ity) are satised.
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3. In the public goods example, robust monotonicity (and thus Maskin and ex post monotonic-
ity) are satised if there is not too much interdependence of preferences. If there is too
much interdependence of preferences, robust monotonicity fails but both Maskin and ex post
monotonicity are satised.
4. In the private good example, ex post monotonicity holds, but Maskin monotonicity (and thus
robust monotonicity) fails. However, in a perturbed version of this example, we again have
robust monotonicity satised if only if there is not too much interdependence of preferences.
Although we will not use it extensively, notice that ifMi and i are nite, then standard duality
arguments imply the following alternative characterization: social choice function f satises robust
monotonicity if for every unacceptable deception , there exist i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that, for all
















for all  i such that 0 i 2  i ( i). Note that this characterization uses the requirement that Y
is a lottery space.
Finally, we need an extremely weak economic condition to ensure that it is always possible to
reward and punish each player independently of the others.
Denition 15 (Bad Outcome)
The bad outcome property is satised if, for each i, there exists y
i
2 Y such that, for all i 2 i,
















This property says that there exists a bad outcome y
i
for each player i such that we can always
o¤er him a lottery that makes him better o¤ whatever his beliefs about other playerstypes and
whatever reports other players are making. The bad outcome property, together with the use of
lotteries, allows us to dispense with any no veto property which typically appear in the su¢ cient
conditions. In addition, we can omit the usual cardinality assumption of I  3.
Theorem 2 (Robust Implementation)
1. If f is robustly implementable, then f satises EPIC and robust monotonicity;
2. if f satises EPIC, robust monotonicity and the bad outcome property, then f is robustly
implementable.
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Proof. (1.) We rst prove that robust implementability implies EPIC and robust monotonicity.
We do so by appealing to the necessary conditions for robust implementation in Corollary 2.





ui (f (i;  i) ; (i;  i)) 
X
m i
i (m i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) ;




, iterative material implementation implies




for all m i 2 SM i ( i). So









for all 0i 2 i.
We next establish robust monotonicity. Fix an unacceptable deception  and suppose that f
is iteratively materially implementable. There must exist a message correspondence prole S such
that






 Si (i) ; (7)





* bi (S) [i] ; (8)
for all i, i and 0i 2 i (i). The existence of such an S can be established constructively. Clearly S
















By (8), simply pick
bmi 2 Si (i) \ SMi  0i and bmi =2 bi (S) [i] \ SMi  0i .
Since message bmi =2 bi (S) [i], we know that for every i 2 (M i  i) such that
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 Sj (j) for all j 6= i,
there exists mi such thatX
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
(10)
Robust Implementation June 8, 2005 29
Next we identify a particular belief i (m i;  i) for which the inequality (10) holds. By (3) in































for all mi 2Mi and 00i 2 i. Thus for any  i 2 ( i), we can set
i (m i;  i) = i (m i) i ( i) .
Applying the above claim (10), there exists mi such that:X
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
But i (m i) > 0) (bmi;m i) 2 SM  0, so by iterative material implementation:
g (bmi;m i) = f  0 :
We also observe that as we dened S to be the set obtained after the k   th iteration of the
operator b, see (9), if 0 i 2  i ( i), then i (m i) > 0 ) m i 2 S i ( i). Thus for every






, there exists mi such thatX
 i;m i
 i ( i) i (m i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
 i;m i










Now, the inequality (12) essentially establishes guarantees the reward inequality for robust monotonic-




g (mi ;m i) i (m i) :



































.13 And by (12) we then have:X
 i












13Note that this step implies that even if we had restricted attention to mechanisms with deterministic outcomes,
our robust monotonicity would only have established that there exists a lottery (not necessarily a deterministic
outcome) su¢ cient to reward a whistle-blower.
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(2.) We now prove that EPIC, robust monotonicity and the bad outcome property imply robust
implementation. We do so by explicitly constructing the implementing mechanism.










, where m1i 2 i, m2i 2 Z+,
m3i :  i ! (Y ) with m3i ( i) 2 Yi ( i), m4i 2 Y . The outcome g (m) is determined by the
following rules.





































) m2i = 1). Suppose that i has conjecture i 2 (M i  i). We can partition the





j = 1 for all j 6= i and m1 i =  i
	
;
and cM i = m i : m2j > 1 for some j 6= i	 .
By the bad outcome property, we know that there exists m4i 2 Y such that, ifX
m i2cM i; i2 i



































































an even better response, contradiction.
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First observe that EPIC implies that i 2 i (i). We will argue that if  is not acceptable, then
b (S) 6= S. By robust monotonicity, we know that there exists i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that, for all


























But now for any conjecture i 2 
n
(m i;  i) : m2j = 1 for all j 6= i
o
, there exists m3i (with
































is never a best response for type i.


















then  is acceptable. Thus f is iteratively materially implemented.
Finally observe that SM must satisfy the ex post best response property, with type i sending








, so robust implementation is possible by Corollary 2.
The proof directly uses the link between iterative and robust implementation for the necessity
as well as the su¢ ciency part. We briey sketch the idea of the necessity part of the proof. If
f is robustly implementable, then it is iteratively implementable by Corollary 2. From iterative
implementability, we then want to show that f satises strict robust monotonicity. We then consider
a given and unacceptable deception . We start the process of iterative elimination and stop it
at a specic round, denoted by k. This round k is the rst round at which we can nd an agent
i, a true type prole i and a report 0i 2 i (i), such that a message, denoted by bmi, which will
survive the process of iterated elimination for type 0i, fails to survive the k-th round of elimination
for type i. We then show that the elimination of message bmi at round k implies that the social
choice function f satises strict robust monotonicity with respect to the deception . Briey, ifbmi survives the process of elimination for type 0i, the message bmi acts in the mechanism so as to
report a payo¤ type 0i. If it is eliminated at round k for payo¤ type i, then this means that for any
belief agent i has over the remaining agents, there exists a message mi which leads to an allocation
through g which is strictly preferred by agent i when he has a payo¤ type i. The signicance of
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round k being the rst round for which such an elimination relative to the deception  occurs, is
that at this round, there do not yet exist any restrictions about message and payo¤ type prole
regarding the other players deception. The fact then that bmi can be eliminated allows us to use
full strength of the elimination argument to establish robust monotonicity. In the context of the
proof it is interesting to note that the key step from iterative elimination to robust monotonicity
is an argument which involves the early stages of the elimination process rather than the limit of
iteration process.
The results of Theorem 2 rely both on allowing lotteries and the bad outcome property. In
Section 9.1, both assumptions are discussed and a simple example satisfying EPIC and robust
monotonicity but not robustly implementable without lotteries is described.
The novel di¢ culty in obtaining the necessary results for implementation arise from the ro-
bustness requirement. If f is robustly implemented, the mechanism which achieves implementation
could be badly behaved with respect to the existence of best responses against all possible beliefs
about action and type proles of the other agents. This di¢ culty did not appear in the direct
robust implementation as direct implementation guaranteed ex post incentive compatibility and
inside the direct mechanism the (non-empty) existence of SM. In Section 9.2 we reconsider the
robust implementation result by restricting attention to nice mechanisms, mechanisms in which
best responses always exist for all beliefs over payo¤ type and message proles.
Finally, in the Appendix we provide a direct proof that interim monotonicity on all type spaces
is equivalent to robust monotonicity. The result, contained in Proposition 6, explicitly constructs a
type space to show that if robust monotonicity fails then there also exists a type space T for which
Bayesian monotonicity fails.
7 Virtual Implementation
In this section, we extend our robustness analysis from interim to virtual implementation. This
section is more limited in scope than the previous sections. The notion of virtual Bayesian im-
plementation is widely considered to be much more permissive than interim implementation (see
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), Duggan (1997) and Serrano and Vohra (2005)).
We shall dene a robust version of virtual implementation and then give a simple condition,
type indistinguishability, to obtain an impossibility result for robust virtual implementation. The
impossibility result will reappear in Section 8. There we consider an environment in which the
payo¤ types can be linearly aggregated with respect to the impact of the types on the utility of
each agent. In this linear environment, we will be able to derive an exact and sharp bound for the
possibility of robust implementation. Conversely, if robust implementation fails the bound, then
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robust virtual implementation will also be impossible. With respect to virtual implementation,
a message of the robustness analysis consequently will be that the di¤erence between interim
and virtual implementation shrinks substantially once we impose the robustness requirement on
implementation.
Denition 16 (Virtual Implementation)
Social choice function f is " implementable by mechanism M on type space T , if there exists an





b (t) jm (mjt)  1  ".
Social choice function f is virtually implementable if it is " implementable for all " > 0.
We denote by g (y jm) the probability that the outcome y is realized conditional on receiving
message m. We next present the robust version of virtual implementation.
Denition 17 (Virtual Robust Implementation)
Social choice function f is " robustly implementable by mechanism M if, on every type space T ,





b (t) jm (mjt)  1  ".
Social choice function f is virtually robustly implementable if it is " robustly implementable for all
" > 0.
In this section, we restrict attention to mechanisms that satisfy a best response property.
Denition 18 (Nice Mechanism)
MechanismM is nice if for all i and i 2 i,





i (m i;  i)ui (g (mi;m i) ; (i;  i)) 6= ?;
for all i 2 (M i  i).
Thus rationalizable sets are non-empty and best responses exist to all conjectures. This restric-
tion is related to restrictions studied in the complete information literature, such as the bounded
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mechanism condition of Jackson (1992), but we have not yet identied the exact relation. Note
that this property is automatically satised if message spaces are nite. Next we present a su¢ cient
condition to obtain an impossibility result for robust virtual implementation.14
Denition 19 (Indistinguishable Payo¤ Types)
Payo¤ types are indistinguishable if, for all i, there exists  i : i ! ( i) such that for all
i; 
0
i 2 i and y, y0 2 Y ,X
 i
































We note that any two types, i and 0i, have to agree in their ranking of the alternatives




, but not for all posterior
distributions. On the other hand, the ranking has to be constant for any arbitrary pair, i; 0i 2 i.
Proposition 3 (Failure of Virtual Robust Implementation)
If types are indistinguishable, then f is virtually robustly implementable by a nice mechanism if and
only if it is constant.
Proof. Clearly f is virtually robustly implementable if it is constant. Suppose that types are
not indistinguishable. Then there exists vi : Y ! R such that type i with beliefs  i ( i) prefers
y to y0 if and only if vi (y)  vi (y0). We argue by induction that for all i and k, there exists mki
such that mki 2 Ski (i) for all i 2 i. It is clearly true for k = 0 and to begin the inductive step











for some mk i 2 Sk i. Now mk+1i 2 S
k+1
i (i) for all i. Thus for each i there exists m

i 2 SMi (i)
for all i. Thus for any mechanismM, there exists y 2 Y such that on any type space, outcome y
is always realized. Thus virtual robust implementation requires that for every " > 0, there exists
y 2 Y such that kf ()  yk  ". This in turn requires that f is constant.
The same argument will imply that if types are indistinguishable, then a social choice function
cannot be implemented by iterated deletion of "weakly ex post dominated" messages, as in Chung
and Ely (2001).
14This condition can be further weakened with an iterative indistinguishability condition that is the robust analogue
of the measurability condition in Abreu and Matsushima (1992b):
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8 Linear Aggregation of Interdependent Types
In this section, we present a class of environments with interdependent preferences, for which we can
derive precise implementation results. The environment is dened to be the class of interdependent
preferences where the payo¤ types can be aggregated linearly for the utility representation. This
class of preferences allows us to clearly illustrate the link between iterative and robust implementa-
tion. With the linear aggregation of the payo¤ types, we obtain two very distinct implementation
results, separated by a sharp bound on the size of the interdependence in the valuations. If there is
not too much interdependence, then robust implementation is possible. Conversely, if there is too
much interdependence, then robust implementation will be impossible, but more surprisingly, even
robust virtual implementation is impossible.
Thus we consider preferences ui (y; ) which permit linear aggregation of the payo¤ types as
follows:
ui (y; ) , vi




with  2 R and i = [0; 1] for all i. We dene the value of the linear aggregator for agent i as i:
i : RI ! R;
and accordingly can write the preferences of agent i as a function of the allocation and the linear
aggregator i, or vi (y; i).
With the linear aggregation of the payo¤ types, we obtain two very distinct implementation
results, separated by a sharp bound on the size of the interdependence in the valuations. We begin
the impossibility result under too muchinterdependence.
Theorem 3 (Virtual Implementation)
If  > 1I 1 , then types are indistinguishable and virtual robust implementation is impossible.
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This implies that types are indistinguishable. While Proposition 3 is written for discrete types, it
extends straightforwardly to compact type spaces.
On the other hand, we have positive implementation results when there is not too much inter-
dependence in preferences. Before we can state the positive implementation results, we need to
make the usual assumptions regarding single crossing to guarantee ex post incentive compatibility
in the direct mechanism.
Denition 20 (Single Crossing)
vi satises single crossing if vi (y0; ) = vi (y; ) and vi (y0; 0) > vi (y; 0) imply vi (y0; e) > vi (y; e)
for all e >  (if 0 > ) and for all e <  (if 0 < ).
This condition requires that for any pair of lotteries y and y0, there is at most one value of the
aggregate of individual types, , where preferences over the lotteries switch. We state the single
crossing condition in terms of the linear aggregator  as we do not make any ordering assumption
about the set of allocations Y .
Denition 21 (Non-degeneracy)
vi is nondegenerate if for all y,  6= 0, there exists y0 such that vi (y0; ) = vi (y; ) and vi (y0; 0) >
vi (y; 
0).
With robust implementation, we need to strengthen the ex post incentive constraints in the
direct mechanism to be strict inequalities.
Denition 22 (Strict Ex Post Incentive Compatibility)






















for all i and  i.
We can now establish the converse to Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 (Robust Implementation)
If  < 1I 1 , strict EPIC holds and each vi satises single crossing and non-degeneracy, then robust
monotonicity is satised.





0i   i .
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0i   i > (1  "). Fix any 0 i. By non-degeneracy of vi, there exists
































. Let yn be a
lottery putting probability 1n on y














































. If this wasnt true, then for every




ei; 0 i > ui f ei; 0 i ;ei; 0 i .








ei; 0 i  ui f ei; 0 i ;ei; 0 i ;
for some ei, contradicting strict EPIC.
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for all  i such that 0 i 2  i ( i). This
establishes robust monotonicity.
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The proof of Theorem 4 use the following four types, i;ei; ni ; 0i of agent i;ordered on the real
line:
i ei ni 0i                              !
R
The current implementation results were obtained within an environment of linear and sym-
metric aggregation:




We can generalize the implementation results in this section to a general, not necessarily symmetric
model of linear aggregation:









. We suspect that an appropriate linearization argument would extend the technique to
general non-linear environments.
Finally, if we impose some additional structure on the payo¤s as a function of the reports in
the direct mechanism, then we can use the same argument as in Theorem 4 to obtain direct robust
monotonicity results.
Denition 23 (Strictly Concave Deviations)
For any ; ui

f
ei;  i ; (i;  i) is strictly concave in ei.
Proposition 4 (Direct Implementation)
If  < 1I 1 , strict EPIC and strictly concave deviations hold and each vi satises single crossing,
non-degeneracy, then robust direct monotonicity is satised.







with ni ! 0i and the sign of ni   0i equal to the sign of i   0i. Since only the direct
mechanism messages are used, the proof then establishes direct robust monotonicity rather than
robust monotonicity.
9 Extensions, Variations and Discussion
9.1 Lotteries, Pure Strategies and Bayesian Implementation
In this section, we discuss how our main Theorem 2 is related to the classic literature on Bayesian
implementation developed by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989)
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and Jackson (1991). These authors asked whether it was possible to implement a social choice
function in equilibrium on a xed type space T .15 These authors analyzed the classic problem
where attention was restricted to pure strategy equilibria and deterministic mechanisms. Thus the
social choice function is a mapping f : ! Z.
Having xed a type space, the natural notion of a pure strategy deception on the xed type
space is a collection  = (1; ::; I), with each i : Ti ! Ti. Thus  : T ! T is dened by
 (t) = (i (ti))
I
i=1. The key monotonicity notion, translated into our language, was then the
following:
Denition 24 (Bayesian Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises Bayesian monotonicity on type space T if, for every deception 
with f





















h (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t0i; t i bi (t i) t0i ; 8t0i:
Jackson shows that this condition is necessary for Bayesian implementation, and that a slight
strengthening, Bayesian monotonicity no veto, is su¢ cient.
In the Appendix (Section 11.3), we show that our robust monotonicity condition is equivalent
to the requirement that Bayesian monotonicity is satised on all type spaces. Thus we have an
alternative way of showing the necessity of robust monotonicity for robust implementation. Figure
1 gave a graphical representation of how the results t together.
But note that this line of argument would establish the necessity of robust implementation if the
planner is restricted to deterministic mechanisms (a disadvantage) but he can assume that players
follow pure strategies (an advantage). How do these assumptions matter?
First, observe that the advantage of restricting attention to pure strategies goes away completely
when we require implementation on all type spaces: if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium that
results in a socially sub-optimal outcome on some type space, we can immediately construct a larger
type space (purifying the original equilibrium) where the socially sub-optimal outcome is played in
15They allowed for more general social choice sets, but we restrict attention to functions for our comparison.
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a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus our robust analysis conveniently removes that unfortunate gap
between pure and mixed strategy implementation that has plagued the implementation literature.
We use the extension to stochastic mechanisms in just two places. Ex post incentive compati-
bility and robust monotonicity would remain necessary conditions even if we restricted attention to
deterministic mechanisms (the arguments would be unchanged). But, as we note in Footnote 13,
even if lotteries were not used in the implementing mechanism, the implied robust monotonicity con-
dition would involve lotteries (as rewards for whistle-blowers). But if lotteries were not allowed, our
su¢ ciency argument would then require a slightly strengthened version of the robust monotonicity
condition, with the lottery y replaced by a deterministic outcome. Our su¢ ciency argument also
uses lotteries under Rules 1 and 2. As in a recent paper by Benoit and Ok (2004) on complete
information implementation, we use lotteries to signicantly weaken the su¢ cient conditions, so
that we require only the "bad outcome" property in addition to EPIC and robust monotonicity. If
we did not allow lotteries in this part of the argument, we would require a much stronger economic
condition in the spirit of Jacksons "Bayesian monotonicity no veto" condition. We have developed
combined robust monotonicity and economic conditions (not reported here) su¢ cient for interim
implementation on all full support types spaces. However, an additional complication is that,
without lotteries in the implementing mechanism, we cannot establish su¢ ciency on type spaces
where agents have disjoint supports.
It is possible to construct a simple example where EPIC and robust monotonicity are not
su¢ cient for robust monotonicity without lotteries by taking the coordination example of Section
3.2 but removing the outcomes e and f . As we show in the Appendix (Section 11.4), robust
implementation is then not possible in this example despite the fact that the social choice function
selects a unique strictly Pareto-dominant outcome at every type prole.
9.2 Nice Mechanisms
In our analysis of robust implementation, we deliberately allowed for very badly behaved innite
mechanisms in order to make a tight connection with the existing literature and to get tight
results. Many authors have argued that "integer game" constructions, like that we use in Theorem
2, should not be taken seriously (see, e.g., Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Jackson (1992)).
In our analysis of virtual robust implementation in Section 7, we restricted attention to "nice"
mechanisms with best responses always well dened. Much of our analysis of the relation between
iterative and robust implementation, and the characterization of robust implementation, would be
much simpler with the restriction to nice mechanisms. In fact with nice mechanisms we obtain the
following stronger necessary conditions for robust implementation.
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Denition 25 (Strict Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satises strict robust monotonicity if for every unacceptable deception ,






, there exists y
such that X
 i2 i



































; 800i . (16)
The proof of the subsequent robust implementation result closely follows the proof of necessity
part of Theorem 2. But the existence of best responses in the denition of a nice mechanism allows
the necessary conditions to be strengthened to their strict versions.
Proposition 5 (Robust Implementation)
If f is robustly implementable by a nice mechanism, then f satises strict EPIC and strict robust
monotonicity.
Proof. See Appendix.
With the restriction to nice mechanisms, the relationship between iterative deletion and robust
implementation emerges more directly. Finally, we should mention that we do not have general
su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation by nice mechanisms, just instances where robust
implementation is possible in the direct mechanism and examples where it is possible in nice
augmented mechanisms (e.g., the coordination example of Section 3.2).
9.3 Extensions
The previous sections examined the importance of our assumptions about lotteries over outcomes
and restrictions on mechanisms. We also restricted attention in our main analysis to the case
of discrete but perhaps innite payo¤ types i and types Ti, although our examples and linear
aggregation results dealt with compact i.
Many of our results would extend easily to more general i and Ti. This is true of the di-
rect implementation analysis, the necessary conditions for robust implementation and the virtual
implementation analysis. The su¢ ciency for robust implementation might be more delicate.
10 Conclusion
This paper examined the robustness of the classic implementation problem. We formalized robust-
ness by requiring that the implementation problem remains solvable as we gradually relax common
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knowledge among the agents and the designer. The weakening of common knowledge was achieved
by considering large type spaces in which the private information of the individual agents becomes
more prominent.
In contrast to our earlier results on truthful implementation, Bergemann and Morris (2004),
robust implementation is in general a more demanding notion of implementation than ex post
implementation. It remains an open question whether a systematic relationships between ex post,
interim and robust implementation do arise in specic environments such as single crossing or
supermodular environments. The analysis of the environment with interdependent values and
linear aggregation in Section 8 clearly suggests that a systematic relationship can be established
for many interesting environments. We also extended the robustness argument to the notion of
virtual implementation. While your analysis here was preliminary, it clearly o¤ered evidence that
the distance between interim and virtual implementation may shrink considerably after imposing
robustness on the implementation concept.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Virtual Implementation in the Single Unit Auction
We complete the iterative implementation argument for the single unit auction example of Section
3.4. We study the following symmetric "-e¢ cient allocation rule is the following:
xi () = "
1
I
i + (1  ")xi () :
The corresponding essentially unique ex post transfer rule is:







1A i + 1
2I
" (i)








Thus if the true type prole is  and agents report themselves to be type prole 0, agent is
expected utility is 0@i + X
j 6=i
j
1Axi  0  yi  0 ;
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1A xi  i + x; 0 i  xi  i; 0 i :








and the second term is maximized by choosing x > max
j 6=i




















and x < max
j 6=i


















This is exactly the same best response property as we obtained in the public good game. Therefore
we get robust implementation in the direct mechanism if  < 1I 1 as in the example of the public
good in Section 3.3.
11.2 A Badly Behaved Mechanism
The example illustrates the gap between the necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 2.
Specically, it shows that there can be an equilibrium for every type space T in a mechanism, yet
SM does not satisfy the ex post best response property.
In the example, there are two agents and there is complete information, so each agent has a
unique type. There are a nite number of outcomes Z = fa; b; cg. The payo¤s are given by the
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following table:
a b c
agent 1  1 0 +1
agent 2 0 0 0
The planners choice (in the unique payo¤ state) is a. Thus it is trivial to robustly implement the
social choice function. But suppose that the planner chooses the following (strange) mechanism:
M1 = f1; 2; 3; ::::g, M2 = f1; 2g and
g (m1;m2) =
8>><>>:
a, if m1 = 1























































Thus the agents are playing the following complete information game:
m1=m2 1 2
1 0; 0 0; 0
2  1; 0 12 ; 0








Now on any type space, there is always an equilibrium where player 1 chooses action 1 and player
2 chooses action 1, and outcome a is chosen. Moreover, on any type space, in any equilibrium,
outcome a is always chosen: if player 1 ever has a best response not to play 1 then he has no best
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response. So he always plays 1 in equilibrium. Thus the trivial social choice function is robustly
implemented by this mechanism.
While only message 1 survives iterated deletion of never best responses for player 1, both
messages survive iterated deletion of never best responses for player 2. Thus we have SM1 = f1g
and SM2 = f1; 2g. Note that SM satises the interim best response property, see Denition 6, but
not the ex post best response property, see Denition 5. For we observe that
u1 (g (1; 2)) = u1 (a) = 0 <
1
2
= u1 (g (2; 2)) ,
violating the ex post best response property.
The insight of the example is that the quantier for every type space T does not necessarily
guarantee that all actions which will be chosen with positive probability in some equilibrium and
for some type space, will also be chosen with probability one in some equilibrium for some type
space. For this reason, the quantier for every type space T does not allow us to establish a
local, i.e. ex post best response property of every action in SM.
11.3 Bayesian Monotonicity
The next proposition establishes the equivalence between robust monotonicity and Bayesian monotonic-
ity on every type space by means of a constructive proof (via a specic type space). The constructive
element is the identication of a type space on which Bayesian monotonicity is guaranteed to fail
if robust monotonicity fails. It is worthwhile to note that the specic type space is much smaller
than the universal type.
In some sense, the notion of robustness is more subtle in the context of full rather than par-
tial implementation. With partial implementation, i.e. truthtelling in the direct mechanism, the
universal type space is by denition the most di¢ cult type space to obtain truthtelling. In the
universal type space, every agent has the maximal number of possible misreports and hence the
designer faces the maximal number of incentive constraints. In the context of full implementation,
the trade-o¤ is ambiguous. As a larger type space contains by denition more types, it o¤ers every
agent more possibilities to misreport. But then, just as a larger type space made truthtelling more
di¢ cult to obtain, the other equilibria might also cease to exist after the introduction of addi-
tional types. This second part o¤ers the possibility that larger type spaces facilitate rather than
complicate the full implementation problem.
Proposition 6 (Equivalence)
Social choice function f satises Bayesian monotonicity on every type space if and only if it satises
robust monotonicity.
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Proof. ())We will show that if robust monotonicity fails, we can construct a type space where
Bayesian monotonicity fails. The argument will be constructive.
Fix an unacceptable deception . Suppose that robust monotonicity fails. Then for each i, i,



















































































ui (y; (i;  i)) .
(19)






given by (17) for which Bayesian







: i 2 i and 0i 2 i (i)
	
; thus there exists a bijection 1i : T
1























. Second, agent i has a set of "pseudo-complete information types"




i ! . The type corresponding





Slightly more formally, we have
Ti = T
1
i [ T 2i .






, then bi (ti) = i;
if ti 2 T 2i and 2i (ti) = , then bi (ti) = i.
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If ti 2 T 2i and 2i (ti) = , then
i (t i) [ti] =
8<: 1; if t i 2 T
1
















































Since  was unacceptable, we must have that f
b (t) 6= f b ( (t)) for some t. Thus the
Bayesian monotonicity condition (Denition 24) for this type space requires that there exist i, ti





















h (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t00i ; t i bi (t i) t00i  ; 8t00i : (21)
The ti cannot be an element of T 2i , because such a type does not expect any deviation from truth-
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condition (22) becomes X
 i2 i




































. But these latter claims contradict our initial
assumption that robust monotonicity fails (i.e., (18)). Thus Bayesian monotonicity fails for this
type space and the claim is proved.
(() Suppose f satises robust monotonicity. Fix any type space T and any deception  with
f
b (t) 6= f b ( (t)) for some t. Dene  by
i (i) =
n
0i : 9ti such that bi (ti) = i and bi (i (ti)) = 0io .
Deception  is unacceptable, so by robust monotonicity, there exist i, i, 0i 2 i (i) such that for






































Now choose any ti such that bi (ti) = i and bi (i (ti)) = 0i. For every (mis-)report 0 i, we now
derive a distribution over payo¤ types  i which represents the likelihood that the report 0 i comes












ft i:bj(j(tj))=0j and bj(tj)=j ; 8j 6=ig bi (t i) [ti]P
ft i:bj(j(tj))=0j , 8j 6=ig bi (t i) [ti]
: (25)







hb i (t i) ;  i hb i (t i)ii if t0i = i (ti)
f
b (t0i; t i) if otherwise . (26)
To establish Bayesian monotonicity, it is enough to show that the two inequalities of Bayesian





















h (i (ti) ; t i) ;b  t0i; t i bi (t i) [ti] ; 8t0i:
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By inserting the posterior beliefs  i and the rewards h (t
0
i; t i), as dened above in (25) and (26)






































































b (t0i; t i) ;b (t0i; t i) bi (t i) [t0i] ; if t0i 6= i (ti)
Now y
hb i (t i) ;  i hb i (t i)ii 2 Yi b i (t i) implies (28).
The proof may appear rather intricate in its details. We next give a brief outline of the basic
steps to show how interim implies robust monotonicity. The proof proceeds by contrapositive. We
start with an unacceptable deception  which by hypothesis fails robust monotonicity and hence
satises the inequalities (18) and (19). For the given deception , we then create a type space,
consisting of two components for every agent i. The rst component for agent i is created by the






, where the rst entry is the true payo¤ type and the second
entry is a feasible deception (under ), or 0i 2 i (i). For this reason, we refer to these types as






there exists at least one particular payo¤ prole 0 i
which acts as a misreport. Under the deception , this payo¤ prole 0 i could have been reported







is given by simply adopting  i
 

i; 0i . The second component consists of pseudo
complete information types, described by ti =  2 . Each such type has a belief that assigns
probability one to the event that the true payo¤ prole is given by  and that all other agents
report the deception type (j ; j), and hence the pseudoin the labelling.
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Given this type space Ti, we then consider a particular deception i : Ti ! Ti. The deception
i is localized around the deception typesand the pseudo complete information typesreport
truthfully. The deception i consists of agent i always reporting his deception type rather than












. We then verify whether f is interim monotone under .
The existence of the pseudo complete information types  forces the interim incentive compatibility
conditions to reduce to ex post incentive compatibility conditions. This guarantees the hypothesis
in the robust monotonicity notion, namely inequality (18), and thus leads to the conclusion in form
of the inequalities (19). But then we obtain a contradiction to the reward condition of interim
monotonicity, unless the hypothesis for the interim monotonicity condition, namely f 6= f  , is
not satised, i.e. f = f   holds, but of course this implies that  is acceptable.
11.4 Coordination Example 2
The next example is the pure coordination game, which we rst considered in Section 3.2, without
the additional allocations, z and z0. It illustrates the importance of lotteries for robust imple-
mentation. The example will satisfy EPIC and robust monotonicity, yet it cannot be robustly
implemented without the use of lotteries. On the other hand if lotteries are allowed then the
lottery which selects each of the four possible outcomes with equal probability constitutes a bad
outcome, and hence the su¢ cient conditions for robust implementation would be satised with
lotteries.
The examples has two agents, i = 1; 2 and each agent i has two possible types, i and 0i. There




1 3; 3 0; 0




1 0; 0 3; 3




1 0; 0 1; 1




1 1; 1 0; 0
01 0; 0 3; 3






As in the example in Section 3.2, the social choice function is strictly ex post incentive compatible
but there is another equilibrium in the "direct mechanism" where each agent misreports his type,
and each agent gets a payo¤ of 1.
Robust monotonicity is clearly satised even if the rewards y are restricted to be the determin-
istic allocations Z. We will show that robust implementation is not possible even in an innite
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mechanism if we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. Fix a mechanismM. Let
Si (i) = fmi : g (mi;mj) = f (i; j) for some mj ; jg ,
be the set of messages for agent i which would select the allocation recommended by the social






[i] (using transnite induction if
necessary). We now show by induction that, Si (i)  Ski (i) for all k using the structure of
the payo¤s. Suppose that this is true for k. Then for any mi 2 Si (i)  Ski (i), there exists















> ui (g (mi;mj) ; (i; j)) = 3.
So mi 2 Sk+1i (i).
Thus we must have that (m1;m2) 2 S1 (1)S2 (2) implies g (m1;m2) = f (1; 2). Let mi ()





=2 Ski (i) .




2 Sk 12 (2) by denition of k. If agent 1 was




, we know that he








is deleted for type 1 at




























S2 (2), a contradiction.
The example uses the fact that the social choice function always selects an outcome that is
strictly Pareto-optimal and - paradoxically - it is this feature which inhibits iterative implementa-
tion in the current example. Borgers (1995) proves the impossibility of complete information im-
plementation of non-dictatorial social choice functions in iteratively undominated strategies when
the set of feasible preference proles includes such unanimous preference proles and the argument
here is reminiscent of Borgersargument.
11.5 Nice Mechanisms and Strict Robust Monotonicity
Proof of Proposition 5. The restriction to nice mechanisms ensures that SM is non-empty. It
follows that if mechanismM iteratively implements f , then, for each i, there exists mi : i !Mi
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such that
g (m ()) = f () and m () 2 SM () ,
we can simply let mi (i) be any element of S
M
i (i).














 ui (f () ; ) .




































































for all 0 i, a contradiction.
Now we establish strict robust monotonicity. Fix an unacceptable deception . Let bk be the





 Ski (i) .
We know that such a bk exists because S0i (i) \ S1i  0i = S1i  0i and, sinceM iteratively imple-





Now we know that there exists i and 0i 2 i (i) such that
S
bk+1











Let bmi 2 Sbki (i) \ S1i  0i ,
and bmi =2 Sbk+1i (i) \ S1i  0i .
Since message bmi gets deleted for i at round bk + 1, we know that for every i 2 (M i  i)
such that
i (m i;  i) > 0) mj 2 S
bk
j (j) for all j 6= i,
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there exists mi such thatX
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (m

i ;m i) ; (i;  i)) >
X
m i; i
i (m i;  i)ui (g (bmi;m i) ; (i;  i)) .
Let bmj 2 S1j  0j
for all j 6= i. Now the above claim remains true if we restrict attention to distributions i putting
probability 1 on bm i. Thus for every  i 2 ( i) such that
 i ( i) > 0) bmj 2 Sbkj (j) for all j 6= i,
there exists mi such thatX
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (m

i ; bm i) ; (i;  i)) >X
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (bmi; bm i) ; (i;  i)) .
But bm 2 S1  0, so (since M iteratively implements f), g (bmi; bm i) = f  0. Also observe that
if 0 i 2  i ( i), then bm i 2 Sbk i ( i). Thus for every  i 2    1 i  0 i, there exists mi such
that X
 i
 i ( i)ui (g (m












which establishes the reward inequality, (15), of strict robust monotonicity.
Now suppose the incentive inequality, (16), are not satised strictly, and hence:
ui









m0i; bm i ;ei; 0 i , (29)
since bm i 2 S1i  0 i, we must have mi 2 S1i ei and thus g (mi; bm i) = f  i; 0 i. Thus from







m0i; bm i ;ei; 0 i
and, for all ei, if
ui

g (mi ; bm i) ;ei; 0 i  ui f ei; 0 i ;ei; 0 i ,
then g (mi ; bm i) = f ei; 0 i.
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 i ( i)ui (g (m
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which concludes the proof. 
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12 Notation
i (i) deception
bi (S) [i] never best response operator





i lower and upper bound for best responses
f social choice function
g outcome function
 interdependence parameter
I number of agents
i ( i;m i) belief of agent i
i linear aggregator of payo¤ types
i (m i) belief over messages
 i ( i) belief over payo¤ types
 i [] specic belief in Bayesian monotonicity





belief over reports and types (in direct mechanism)
Si; S message correspondence
Ski strategies surviving k   th round of elimination
ti; t type (prole)
i;  payo¤ type
 i [; ] payo¤ type in Bayesian monotonicity
ui utility
vi utility with linear aggregator
y allocation
y [; ] reward in Bayesian monotonicity
yi monetary transfer
Y = (Z) extended outcome space
Yi ( i) incentive compatible reward set
Y i ( i) strictly incentive compatible reward set
 message
Z outcome space
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